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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
TIME LIMITATIONS ON WARRANTIES:
APPLICATION AND VALIDITY UNDER THE U.C.C.
Courts under common law and the Uniform Commercial Code
have applied diverse theories to clauses establishing time limitations
on the period during which a buyer can bring a claim for breach of
warranty. Under common law a time clause was held invalid if it was
unreasonable, while under the Code three different approaches are
possible. The first allows a court to invalidate a clause if it is mani-
festly unreasonable. The second approach allows the court to provide
a buyer with relief if the clause eliminates all of a buyer's remedies
for breach of the warranty. Under the third approach the courts may
invalidate a clause if it is found to be unconscionable. As a result of
this diversity, courts have applied different theories to similar fact pat-
terns and have created an element of confusion as to the law applicable
to time limitations on warranties. This comment examines the different
theories that courts have applied to time limit clauses in sales war-
ranties. The three methods provided by the Code will be examined in
the light of common law to determine which is most applicable to this
area.
I. PRE-CODE CASES AND THEORY
Under common law where two parties agreed to a time limit for
the submission of claims of breach of warranty, the courts generally held
such limitations valid, provided the specific time period involved was
reasonable.1 Reasonableness was determined in respect to the type of
defect upon which the claim of breach of warranty was alleged, 2 with-
out regard to whether the warranty was express or implied. When
the defect "is one which cannot be discovered by ordinary inspection
. . . whether the seller's breach of obligation is of an express warranty,
an implied warranty, or, under the terminology of the court, breach of
a promise not properly classified as a warranty, the buyer may recover
damages."3 Where an inspection would have revealed open defeats,
claims for breach of warranty for these defects were barred after the
time period had expired. But if the defect was hidden, both implied
and express warranties were still in effect despite time limitations.4
Even very short time periods were held reasonable in respect to obvious
defects. Thus, where a defect could have been discovered upon ordinary
1 See, e.g., Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d 77
(1950).
2 Id. at 379, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
8 3 S. Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods 489b (rev. ed. 1948).
4
 Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378, 379, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 77, 78
(1950). See also Colvin v. Superior Equip. Co., 96 Ariz. 113, 118-20, 392 P.2d 778,
781-82 (1964).
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examination of the goods or a sample, time periods as short as five
days have been held valid,' and the buyer's failure to act within such
time amounted to a waiver of his warranty.' Where the defect was
latent, "Mlle time which this defect took to assert itself fixed the rea-
sonableness of the time for complaint . . . ." 1 Where the buyer notified
the seller of a latent defect within a reasonable time, the courts treated
the situation the same as if no clause was agreed upon, giving no weight
to the fact that the buyer had agreed to a time period.
Provisions in sales contracts requiring prompt inspection or test-
ing of the goods and prompt notice of any defects within a specified
period are a common part of commercial transactions. Prompt notice
allows the seller to rectify the problem before considerable damage
occurs, and in turn saves the buyer further expense and trouble, as
where the goods are to be manufactured for consumption by the gen-
eral public. Courts look favorably upon such agreements as serving
a legitimate business purposes only if they are reasonable, the defect
is obvious and prompt notice is possible.'
Not all defects, however, can be handled with such prompt re-
sponse, and in order to prove the limitation unreasonable, the buyer
must then show that prompt response with respect to the alleged defect
was not possible. In Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber
Packing Corp.," the buyer, a wholesaler, received in March, 303 cases
of ketchup, 271 of which remained unsold by September. The cases
were then inspected by federal authorities, and after microscopic ex-
amination the ketchup was found to contain a mold filament in 67 per-
cent of the microscopic fields examined. The ketchup was condemned
and a United States Marshall, acting under a court order, destroyed it.
The buyer sued the seller for return of the purchase price. As a defense
the seller offered a clause in the sales contract providing for all claims
to be made within ten days from receipt of the goods. The court said,
with respect to timeliness, that such clauses are valid where the defect
is patent but not where it is latent." In this case there was no doubt of
latency because the presence of the mold could only be detected by
microscopic examination, hence, the claim for breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness was not barred since prompt notice was impossible.
In a similar case where the latency concerned a defect in the size of
canned prunes, the court stated that a stipulation as to time limits on
5 Pratt v. Meyer, 75 Ark. 206, 87 S.W. 123 (1905).
6 Id. at 211, 87 S.W. at 125.
7 Los Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n v. Pacific Grocery Co., 119 Wash. 293, 297, 205
P. 375, 377 (1922).
8 Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Iowa L.
Rev. 843, 858 (1960).
9 Prompt notice is possible where, for example, there is damage to canned foods
in transit, rustiness of the can or faulty labeling. National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low
Preserving Co., 170 Wash. 575, 585, 17 P.2d 51, 54 (1932).
10 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
11 Id. at 421, 73 P.2d at 1275.
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claims applies only to easily observable defects. 12 It was held not
incumbent on a buyer to open cans he will later sell to examine the
number and size of goods he had purchased; otherwise he would not
know how many the law required him to open and where he was to
stop." Such a requirement clearly would be unfair and unreasonable.
Furthermore, in some cases cans were opened, goods were examined
within the time limitation and appeared to be suitable. However, after
the period had expired, defects appeared. It was held that such inspec-
tion did not prejudice the buyer's rights in regard to latent defects."
Where the defect has not appeared until after the use of a product
the courts have held time clauses unreasonable, just as they have in
cases where the defect was not discovered until after goods were pro-
cessed." In W. T. Adams Mach. Co. v. Turner, 16 involving the sale
of machinery which contained hidden imperfections, the court said
that the time clause had no effect on the express warranty except with
respect to defects of obvious character. To hold otherwise would result
in an important qualification of the warranty, since in cases where an
imperfection could not be discovered until after use of the product,
application of a time limit would deprive the buyer of several features
of the warranty. The court stated "Mt is not reasonably possible that
the parties so intended in this contract!'
Once a time limitation clause was held invalid, a reasonableness
test was used to determine the length of time the buyer had to notify
the seller of the defect. In Torrance v. Durisol, Inc., 18 involving the
sale and installation of defective roofing materials by a sub-contractor
to a contractor, a ten-day time limitation was held invalid. The court
then declared that notice of breach of warranty must be given within
a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ought to know of such
breach. In this case the notice was timely because it was given shortly
after it became possible to discover the defect, and therefore the seller
was held liable." The question of reasonableness is one of fact for the
12 National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low Preserving Co., 170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d
51 (1932).
13 Id. at 584, 17 P.2d at 54.
14 Los Angeles Olive Growers Ass'n v. Pacific Grocery Co., 119 Wash. 293, 294-
96, 205 P. 375, 376 (1922).
15 In Jesse! v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1950),
the seller expressly warranted the goods to be washable, preshrunk and fast color. There
was a time limitation clause of ten days and the clause also provided no claim would
be accepted after the goods were cut or processed. The buyer discovered the goods were
not as warranted, but not until after they were cut and processed, which occurred more
than ten days after receipt. The court said the defect was latent and not discoverable
until after processing, therefore the limitation was unreasonable and could not stand.
The buyer's right of inspection included a reasonable time in which to ascertain the
quality of the goods. Id. at 379, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
16 162 Ala. 351, 50 So. 308 (1909).
17 Id. at 356, 50 So. at 309.
18 20 Conn. Supp. 62, 122 A.2d 589 (Super. Ct. 1956).
19 Where a time limitation is held invalid, a buyer still may not recover if he waits
too long after the discovery of the defect before giving notice. If be waits an unreason-
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jury in determining whether the limitation was unreasonable, and, if
so, whether notice was given within a reasonable time.'
The Uniform Commercial Code adopted, with some variation, the
reasonableness approach. Different approaches also were provided by
the Code under sections concerned with sales agreements and warranties.
The question arises as to whether the reasonableness test of the Code
is the same as that of common law, and whether the approaches
adopted by other Code sections are equally applicable to time clauses.
II. CASES AND APPROACHES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
A. The Reasonableness Approach
The Code allows the parties to fix a specific time for notification,
and section 1-204 holds such time limiting clauses valid unless they
are manifestly unreasonable. 21 Thus, time clauses are generally valid
under the Code, "however, provision is made for disregarding a clause
which whether by inadvertance or overreaching fixes a time so unrea-
sonable that it amounts to eliminating all remedy under the con-
tract."22 In determining what is a reasonable time under both com-
mon law and the Code, the nature, purpose and circumstances of the
transaction are taken into account.
The approach under section 1-204 is similar to the approach of
the pre-Code cases, except that section 1-204 uses the term "manifestly
unreasonable." This change is surprising since there was no other view-
point under common law and the reasonability theory was not crit-
icized. A problem therefore arises as to whether the term "manifestly"
changes the common law approach. Authorities have not closely stud-
ied this problem although some commentators mention that an element
able amount of time, the seller is protected. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Birds-
boro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 548, 559, 52 A.2d 344, 350 (1947).
20 Id. at 5.59, 52 A.2d at 350. See also National Container Corp. v. Regal Cor-
rugated Box Co., 383 Pa. 499, 505, 119 A.2d 270, 273 (1956).
21 Unless otherwise specified all references to the Uniform Commercal Code are to
the 1962 Official text. U.C.C. § 1-204 provides:
(1) Whenever this act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable
time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature,
purpose and circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the time
agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
22 U.C.C. § 1-204, Comment 1. The Comment states in pertinent part:
Subsection (1) recognizes that nothing is stronger evidence of a reason-
able time than the fixing of such time by a fair agreement between the parties.
However, provision is made for disregarding a clause which whether by inad-
vertance or overreaching fixes a time so unreasonable that it amounts to elim-
inating all remedy under the contract „ .
U.C.C. § 1-204, Comment 2 states in part:
[T]he circumstances of the transaction, including course of dealing or
usages of trade or course of performance may be material. On the question what
is reasonable time these matters will often be important.
343
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of confusion and inconsistency results," and suggest a rewording of
section 1 -204 to clarify or define the meaning of "manifestly unrea-
sonable."'
One view interprets the use of "manifestly" as intended to dis-
tinguish between clauses that are mandatory and those that are
optional." If the clause is mandatory and cannot be varied by the
buyer, the agreement fixing a set time would presumably be invalid,
if the set time is unreasonable. Thus, the fact that the clause is both
mandatory and unreasonable would make it manifestly unreasonable.
On the other hand, where the parties are free to fix the time in question
by their own agreement, the fact that the time agreed on is unreason-
able may not be controlling. Under this view a stricter test is used if
the parties are free to bargain on the time period.
Another view is that in the area of sales the word "manifestly"
adds nothing to the pre-Code approach." Where section 1-204 is ap-
plied to a sales agreement it becomes involved with other sections,
specifically sections 2-607 (3) (a)" and 2-608(2)." These sections
provide that in the absence of a time limitation a buyer must notify
the seller within a reasonable time after he has or should have dis-
covered a breach of the warranty or else his claim is barred. Thus, by
this approach section 1-204, in respect to warranties governed by Article
2, interprets "manifestly unreasonable" as meaning "unreasonable,"
so as to apply the same standard as that of common law.
It is submitted that the better view as to the significance of the
modifier "manifestly" is that the drafters intended to apply a stricter
test to the buyer who has agreed to a time clause than the test used
when there is no time clause." The Official Comment to section 1-204
does not mention the term "manifestly," but words like "obviously
unfair," and "so unreasonable that all remedy is exhausted" are used,
implying that the drafters intended a stricter standard than that of
common law." Since the Code does not define "manifestly," courts
23 1 New York State Law Revision Commission [N.Y.S.L.R.C.], Study of the Uni-
form Commercial Code 317-18 (1955). The Commission noted that the meaning attached
to the word "manifest" by the Comment to § 1-204 was inconsistent with the introduc-
tory words of subsection (
N.Y.S.L.R.C., Proceedings of the Commission 363 (1956).
25 1 N.Y.S.L.R.C., Study of the U.C.C. 317 (1955).
26 Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 398, 204 A.2d 494 (1964) (by implication).
27 U.C.C.	 2-607(3)(a) provides:
[W]here a tender has been accepted the buyer must within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller
of the breach or be barred from any remedy.
28 	§ 2-608(2) provides:
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
29 Although §§ 2-607(3)(a) and 2-608(2) use the word "reasonable," they
apply when there is no time clause. Section 1-204(1) applies when there is a time clause
and uses the term "manifestly unreasonable."
3° U.C.C. § 1-204, Comment 1.
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should provide the necessary guidance. These guidelines have not been
supplied since there are few cases under the Code dealing with time
limitations, and in those cases the courts employ the same reasoning
as pre-Code cases, thus supporting the view that the approach of the
Code is the same as common law.
In Vandenberg v. Sitern the seller, who was a grower and dealer
of flower bulbs, sued the buyer, a flower dealer, for the purchase price
of certain bulbs. The buyer counterclaimed averring beach of an ex-
press warranty that the bulbs were to be healthy and sound at the
time of shipment, and breach of the implied warranty in that they were
to be fit for the purpose for which they were sold." The contract also
stated that "all claims hereunder shall be deemed waived unless pre-
sented within eight (8) days after receipt of the goods."" The bulbs
appeared in good condition upon receipt but a month later brown
specks developed and an expert was consulted. It was determined that
the bulbs were not merchantable and thus were not worth planting.
Judgment was for the seller since the buyer's expert testimony that it
was not possible to discover this condition until flowering time, or
until some time beyond the time period for claims, was excluded by
the trial court which took the position that no evidence was admissible
relative to events occurring after the eight day period."
The appellate court reversed and remanded, basing its holding on
section 1-204. The court reasoned that if the jury believed that the
bulbs' failure to flower resulted from a defective condition existing at
the time of shipment, the failure fell within the express warranty." The
appellate court held that the trial court was in error in not admitting
the evidence, and that it was for the jury to decide if the eight day
period was reasonable." The court held that if the defects were latent
and could not be discovered within the time period, section 1-204 would
apply to invalidate the clause." The court stated:
[P]arties may by their contract limit the time for . . . notice
. . . but the limitation must be reasonable. A limitation which
renders the warranty ineffective as regards latent defects,
literally covered by the warranty but not discoverable within
the limitation period . .. is manifestly unreasonable and
therefore invalid under § 1-204 of the code."
31 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
32 Id. at 393, 204 A.2d at 496.
33 Id. at 394, 204 A.2d at 496.
84 Id. This seems to be a mistake on the part of the trial court since the evidence
should have been admitted to throw light on the clause and the circumstances of this
particular business.
35 Id. at 395, 204 A.2d at 497. According to the court the bulbs' flowering ability
at the time of shipment was warranted and if the defect existed at that time, even if
not discoverable until some time later, the warranty was breached.
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The court went on to cite as precedent pre-Code cases with similar
reasoning, holding time clauses invalid as unreasonable with respect
to latent defects." The court used the words "manifestly unreason-
able" and "unreasonable" interchangeably, and did not concern itself
with a definition of the term "manifestly" but merely applied the
same reasoning as pre-Code cases.
Another recent case under the Code which employed section 1-204
without considering the meaning of the word "manifest" was Neville
Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp." Union Carbide processed natural
gas, reduced it to a liquid form, refined it and sold one of the resulting
products, a resin oil, to Neville Chemical who used the oil, designated
U-171, in the manufacture of resins for shoe soles and other products.
This case involved a large shipment of U-171 under a contract of sale
with a clause providing that the buyer accepted all material and
waived all claims with respect thereto, unless notice was given within
fifteen days.41 A contaminant entered the production process of U-171
at one of the seller's plants and started a chemical combination with
the natural components of the oil. The U-171 was shipped to the buyer
who in turn produced his resin and sold it to manufacturers of
various goods. After end products had been produced and had en-
tered the hands of consumers, the contaminant in the U-171 began
its reverse process, breaking down into components and producing a
foul odor, which necessitated the destruction of the product. In the
resulting suit brought by Neville, the seller relied on the time clause as
relieving it from any warranty obligation.
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
obserired that the defect was not only latent and nondiscover-
able by ordinary testing, but that there was no reason to even sus-
pect the presence of the contaminant until the complex chemical
process began its reverse reaction. Once the breakdown began, it was
relatively easy to identify the Neville resin as the source of the odor,
but only after long and extensive research was the U-171 pinpointed
as the source of the contaminant. Therefore, the court stated, "we
have little hesitation in deciding that the application of the time limita-
tion is manifestly unreasonable" 42 and is therefore invalid under sec-
tion 1-204. It did not however differentiate between unreasonable and
manifestly unreasonable, but merely stated that the time clause was
manifestly unreasonable with respect to the latent defect.
The Vandenberg and Neville courts treatment of section 1-204 as
a continuation of pre-Code law can be interpreted as a trend future
cases will take in respect to time clauses and latent defects, yet the
39 Id. at 398, 399, 204 A.2d at 498.
40 294 F. Supp. 649 M.D. Pa. 1968).
41 Id. at 654.
42 Id. at 655. The court cited the Vandenberg case in support of its holding. Also, the
court was disturbed by evidence to the effect that Union Carbide had information in its
files which had been circulated to certain personnel connected with production of U-171,
advising of contact with a contaminant and requesting reports of any adverse reaction.
No information was sent to any of the buyers of U-171. Id. at 653-54.
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cases presented such clear facts that the courts were not required to
distinguish between manifest and plain unreasonableness. If cases
arise with less compelling fact situations the courts will be required
to distinguish and define "manifestly" as meaning more than plain
unreasonableness, as is the preferable result, or definitely state that
"manifestly unreasonable" is simply another way of stating "unrea-
sonable."
Once a time clause is found to be invalid under section 1-204,
section 2-607(3)(a) applies and the buyer must give the seller notice
of the breach within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or should
know, of the breach or the buyer is barred from making his claim."
This is the same test that was used at common law once a time clause
was found unreasonable, and, as under the common law, this question
is for the jury."
B. The Remedy Theory
Some authorities have suggested another approach by means of
which buyers may circumvent time clauses. This approach is the use
of section 2-719(2),46 whereby a clause which limits a buyer's remedy
under the warranty is invalidated. Section 2-719(2) has been used
to provide a new remedy where an exclusive or limited remedy fails
its essential purpose. For example, a remedy for breach of warranty
based on a claim of a latent defect not discoverable within the time
period fails if it is barred by a time clause. However, a major part of
the buyer's value of the bargain is his warranty. Thus, the Official Com-
ment to section 2-719(2) says, if circumstances cause an apparently
reasonable clause to fail in its purpose or deprive a party of the sub-
stantial value of the bargain, it cannot stand and the general remedy
provisions of the article become applicable."
The court in Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 47
invalidated a time clause by applying section 2-719(2). The case in-
volved the sale of a quantity of yarn which was delivered, cut, and
knitted into sweaters, and then washed. It was then discovered that
the color of the yarn had shaded," thus making the sweaters unmer-
chantable. The sales contract provided:
2. No claims relating to . . . shade shall be allowed if made
after weaving, knitting or processing or more than 10
48 	§ 2-607(3) (a). Section 2-608 (2) provides that a precondition to revoca-
tion of acceptance is that the goods not be changed in a substantial way except where
the change is caused by their own defects.
44 Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 13 (C.P. 1964) ; General Foods Corp. v.
Bittineer Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 282, 285 (C.P. 1963).
43 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) provides that "where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose remedy may be had as provided in this
Act."
46 U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1.
47 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
48 Id. at 401, 244 N.E.2d at 686, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 110. "Shaded" means that there
is a variation of color from piece to piece and within each piece.
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days receipt of shipment. . . . The buyer shall within 10
days . . .. examine the merchandise for any and all defects.
4. . . . It is expressly agreed that no representations or war-
ranties . . . have been or are made by the seller except as
stated herein, and the seller makes no warranty, express
or implied, as to the fitness for the buyer's purposes of
yarn purchased hereunder, seller's obligations, except as
expressly stated herein, being limited to the delivery of
good merchantable yarn . .42
The seller did not dispute the fact that the yarn was unmerchantable,
but relied on the buyer's failure to present his claim within the time
limit. The buyer claimed that the time limit was unreasonable. The
court cited section 2-607(3)(a) as providing buyers with a reasonable
time for notification, but also recognized that the Code allows parties
to modify warranties and to limit times for notice and remedies for
their breach.
The court held that the limitation was invalid under section 2-719
(2)," noting that the Official Comment to that section states that it is
the essence of a sales contract that at least minimum remedy be avail-
able in case of breach, and that any clause that limits or modifies the
remedial provisions of Article 2 in an unconscionable manner may be
deleted, in which case the remedies provided by the article, become
applicable.' The court said that the time clause eliminated all remedy
for defects that were not reasonably discoverable before knitting and
processing, and therefore section 2-719(2) applied. The limitation
clause, so far as it related to latent defects, could not stand and gave
way to the general rule that a buyer has a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered the defect to notify the seller of
the breach of warranty. 52
Although the result reached in this case was similar to pre-Code
cases, the approach was totally different in that a remedy theory was
applied. In a concurring opinion Chief Judge Fuld disagreed with the
reasoning of the court. He said the question was simply whether the
time limit was manifestly unreasonable when applied to the type of
latent defect mentioned in the case." He asserted that the case came
under section 1-204, and that it was "not necessary to consider the
relevancy, if any, of other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(e.g., §§ 2-302, 2-316, 2-719), dealing with 'unconscionable' contracts
or clauses, exclusion or implied warranties of or limitations on dam-
ages."" The majority opinion was in fact rather unclear, if not confus-
49 Id.
5° Id. at 404, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
m Id. at 403, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112. The court cited U.C.C.
§ 2-719, Comment 1.
52 Id. at 405, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The court cited U.C.C.
§ 2-607(3) (a) .
53 Id. at 406, 244 N.E.2d at 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
54 Id.
348
TIME LIMITATIONS ON WARRANTIES
ing, since the court cited many different sections, and then settled on
2-719(2) to invalidate the time clause." The court in using section
2-719(2) joined authorities who view this section as governing within
the theory of remedies, a clause limiting time for notice of breach."
This view states that if the time limit, though reasonable at the time
of agreement, becomes unreasonable through change of circumstances,
section 2-719(2) invalidates the time clause." Thus, under this view
one must examine all the circumstances, since "the subsection is not
concerned with arrangements which were oppressive at their inception,
but rather with the application of an agreement to novel circumstances
not contemplated by the parties.”" Section 2-719(2), however, has
been criticized for being overly broad and for providing means to dis-
regard a party's agreement with respect to remedies without setting
any proper standards. 59
The court in Neville also discussed section 2-719(2), but used it
not to invalidate a time clause but to invalidate a clause limiting
damages to return of the purchase price. In that case the defect was
not discoverable until the end product was in consumer hands, and
such a remedy as the clause called for was "far below a bare minimum
in quantum, and [was] ineffective under the Uniform Commercial Code,
§ 2-719(2). 7" Thus, Neville used section 2-719(2) with respect to
damages but not with respect to the time clause. Therefore the ques-
tion arises whether section 2-719(2) should be restricted to clauses
which specify the type and amount of damages recoverable. It is sub-
mitted that the approach taken by the Neville court is correct. This
is shown by the placement of that section within Article 2. Section
2-719 discusses damages, sufficient remedies and modification of the
measure of damages," while section 2-718 deals with liquidated dam-
55 Sections of the U.C.C. cited by the court included §§ 1-204(1), 2-302(2),
2-314(2), 2-316(1), (4), 2-607(3)(a), 2-718, 2-719(2).
50 See Ganz, Limitation of Liability Under the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 14 DePaul L. Rev. 73, 79 (1964).
57 See Hawicland, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 How. L.J. 28, 42 (1965).
55 1 N.Y.S.L.R.C., Study of the U.C.C. 584 (1955).
50 N.Y.S.L.R.C., Proceedings of the Commission 401 (1956). Section 2-719(2) was
disapproved by the commission.
00 294 F. Supp. at 655.
01 U.C.C. § 2-719 provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substi-
tution for those provided in this Article and may Emit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the
price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
Parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy,
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
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ages." These sections declare that if a contract provides for liquidated
damages and subsequent events make it clear that another adequate
remedy is conveniently available, the liquidated damage provision fails
of its essential purpose and gives way to general remedies." Thus,
section 2-719(2) is primarily applicable to damage clauses and to
liquidated damage remedies. The section 2-719 approach is based on
the fact that the buyer is left without a remedy. However, before one
can apply section 2-719 it must first be decided if the buyer has a valid
claim, and this is done by applying section 1-204. Thus, unless the time
clause is manifestly unreasonable, the buyer would not have a valid
claim and section 2-719 could not be applied.
C. The Unconscionability Approach
The Wilson court" and the Official Comments to sections 1-204
and 2-719 use the term "unconscionability." This is another Code
theory applicable to time clauses and latent defects which brings yet
a third section of the Code into the problem. Section 2-302(1) provides
that if a court as a matter of law finds a contract or any part of one
to be unconscionable at the time it was made, it may refuse to enforce
it, or may enforce the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
may limit the application of such clause to avoid any unconscionable
result." Section 2-302 has been suggested as an approach to the
problem of time limitations," but no cases have used this section to
invalidate a time clause as unconscionable. Unconscionability gen-
erally includes an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties coupled with contract terms very favorable to the other.
To determine the presence of meaningful choice an examination is
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
62
 U.C.C. § 2-718.
Oa Hawkland, supra note 57, at 39.
64 23 N.Y.2d at 403 & n.1, 244 N.E.2d at 688 & n.l, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112 Sr n.l.
U.C.C.ea  § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall he afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
66 Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 403, 244 N.E.2d
685, 687, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112 (1968). Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843, 858 (1960). The Comment to § 2-302 cites a
pre-Code case which involved a time clause and a latent defect as illustrative of the
underlying basis of the section. However, that case, Kansas City Wholesale Grocery
Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937), invalidated the clause
as being unreasonable, which may indicate that § 1-204 is most effective to meet
the problem of time clauses.
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made of the circumstances surrounding the transaction to establish,
for example, whether there was such gross inequality of bargaining
power on the part of one of the parties sufficient to negate any real
choice.67 According to the Official Comment to section 2-302, the basic
test is whether, in light of the general commercial background and
needs of the particular case, the clause involved is so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the making of
the contract.
The court in Wilson spoke of unconscionability and section 2-302
by citing the Official Comment to section 2-719 and then stating that
contractual limitations on remedies are generally to be enforced unless
unconscionable." Yet the court refused to rule on the issue of the un-
conscionability of the time clause, declaring that it was unnecessary
since section 2-719(2) applied." The court felt that sections 2-719(2)
and 2-302 must work together, that 2-719(2) incorporates 2-302, and
that section 2-719 was better suited to meet the problem of time clauses
than section 2-302 alone.
Although the drafters of the Code seemingly support this view
since the Official Comment to section 2-719 uses the word "uncon-
scionable" apparently to mean "very unfair" or "totally unreasonable,"
the concept of unconscionability as used in section 2-302 has a differ-
ent meaning, and is more limited in scope and operation than in section
2-719. These sections are not necessarily partners, and section 2-719
does not include or incorporate the concept of unconscionability as
used in section 2-302. A clause which violates section 2-719 may not
be unconscionable, whether one views the section as applying to time
limitations or not. Under section 2-719 different facts must be estab-
lished, for it must be ascertained whether the buyer lost a substantial
value of the bargain and whether the essential purpose of the time
clause failed. Under section 2-719(2), even if the clause was originally
fair, if later circumstances leave the buyer without a remedy the
clause may be invalidated. Under section 2-302 later circumstances
are immaterial, since a finding of unconscionability is based only upon
the circumstances existing at the making of the contract." Just as it is
submitted that the Wilson court incorrectly applied section 2-719 to
the area of time clauses, it is further submitted that it could not have
applied section 2-302, because it did not determine if there was in-
equality of bargaining power or if there was overbearing by the seller,
and did not examine the situation at the time the contract was signed. 71
67 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
68 23 N.Y.2d at 403, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
69 Id. at 404, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
U.C.C. § 2-302 & Comment 1. See also 58 Dick. L. Rev. 161 (1954).
71 The court rejected Vandenberg and stated that the Vandenberg court neglected
to consider unconscionability and other related code sections, and that the question of
limitations of remedy is for the court and not the jury. Yet the Wilson court itself
did not find the clause unconscionable. This seems to indicate the Wilson court would
prefer the court to rule on time clauses and therefore refused to apply § 1-204 which
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The history of section 2-302 indicates that it is the most difficult
of the three theories to apply to time clauses. Most cases applying sec-
tion 2-302 involve parties of such unequal bargaining power as to ren-
der the agreement oppressive. As the Official Comment to the section
states: "The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise."" In a case where a time limitation was forced on the buyer
by a seller in a superior position, a court could find the clause uncon-
scionable. But usually in time limitation cases such is not the circum-
stance. The two parties are, in most instances, businessmen of basi-
cally equal bargaining position, and the time clause is part of the
commercial background, facts which must be taken into account and
examined by the court." As for unfair surprise, normally the buyer
knows of the clause and is not surprised, or, if so, not unfairly. 74
 Even
if the result is unfair, if the two parties had equal bargaining positions,
then the clause is not unconscionable. Only when a contract is not the
result of a true bargain can a court then consider unconscionability."
Some commentators believe the application of the concept of
unconscionability to unreasonably brief time clauses would not be a
great departure from the reasonableness approach, but would be more
direct and realistic." The reason given is that unconscionability is
concerned with the objective situation of the parties with reference
to the contract, rather than with the supposed intent of the parties,
and that it has the necessary flexibility to deal with a broad range of
commercial transactions." However, these commentators misconstrue
the purpose of section 2-302 and the application of 1-204, the rule of
reasonableness. Section 1-204 also has flexibility, and allows consider-
ation of the commercial background and the nature, purpose and cir-
cumstance of the transaction. Also, under section 1-204 intent is not the
prime consideration, but, rather, whether the clause itself, considered
apart from the intent of the parties, is reasonable.
One difference between the two approaches is that section 1-204
requires a determination as to whether the time limitation was suffi-
cently reasonable viewed from the present looking back, while section
is the reasonableness test. 23 N.Y.2d at 403 n.1, 244 N.E.2d at 687-88 n.1, 297 N.Y.S.2d
at 112 n.l.
72 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. See 58 Dick. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1954), which states:
It would seem that by "oppression and unfair surprise" it is meant any party
who has had a chance to inquire into the merits and consequences of the bargain
and who has had the competency to understand it, could not be a victim of
oppression and unfair surprise.
73 See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. See also 58 Dick. L. Rev. 161, 163 (1954).
74
 See Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach
to TJ.C.C. Section 2-302, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 998 (1966), which states that if the buyer
should reasonably have known and understood the relevant terms, then if surprised, the
surprise is not unfair.
75
 Id. at 1002. "[T]hat inequality of bargaining power should be a sine qua non
to a finding of unconscionability may be seen by analysis of the relation between that
section 2-302 and the doctrine of freedom of contract." Id. at 1001.
76 Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Iowa L.
Rev. 843, 858 (1960).
77 Id.
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2-302 only looks to the circumstances at the time of the making of
the contract." Thus, under section 1-204 if the defect was patent the
clause is reasonable, but if the defect was latent then the clause is most
likely unreasonable and void. Although apparently fair and reasonable
at the onset, circumstances which were unforeseen have caused the
clause to become unreasonable and section 1-204 applies. Under section
2-302 a court cannot say that the circumstances have caused a time
clause to become unconscionable. The court cannot apply hindsight,
since the clause was either unconscionable at the onset or not at all.
Another difference is that section 2-302 requires an examination to
determine oppressiveness, while section 1-204, requires a determina-
tion as to the reasonableness of the length of time. Section 1-204 there-
fore is clearly more applicable to the problem of time clauses than
section 2-302. Also the use of section 2-302 puts a taint on the whole
contract, even if only the time clause is struck as unconscionable. With
the use of section 1-204 the rest of the contract is unaffected. Thus it is
concluded that section 2-302 is neither appropriate nor necessary since
section 1-204 clearly applies and provides adequate remedies.
CONCLUSION
Of the three Code sections applicable to time limitations in war-
ranty clauses, the most appropriate is section 1-204. Section 2-719 is
inappropriate since it is primarily concerned with liquidated damage
provisions. Section 2-302 is difficult to apply since it requires the courts
to make a precise and limited factual determination. Since that de-
termination does not consider circumstances arising after the time of
the making of the contract', factors which are relevant to the validity
of a time clause cannot be taken into account under section 2-302.
Section 1-204, however, is primarily concerned with time clauses, and
it requires the court to consider only those factors relevant to the
reasonableness of the time clause. That section's flexibility precludes
the application of other Code sections to problems relating to time
limitations on warranties.
DANIEL H. LIDMAN
78 U.C.C. § 2-302.
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